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assess the prospects for successful management of tensions through a sharedjurisdiction arrangement that satisfies
both countries’ territorial objectives.
The book is a densely packed, academic
work. The opening chapter, in which
Manicom lays his theoretical foundations and analytical framework, will
demand particular effort from readers
seeking immediate, practical insights.
However, this academic investment is
well worth the effort. The follow-up
analysis is exceptionally insightful for
not only academics but also policy makers, strategists, and military professionals. Its tone, however, reflects the fact
that the author did most of his research
in Japan (only five of the twenty-six
interviews were conducted in Beijing),
and Manicom seems intermittently challenged to shake a Japanese perspective.
A more significant shortfall is that the
book qualifies its strong case for optimism with two significant caveats. First,
Manicom notes that past cooperation
has only resulted when “material issues
have been separated from the more
symbolic aspects of [Sino-Japanese]
relations” and that the countries have the
greatest difficulty finding paths to cooperation over contested symbolic and
strategic issues. Second, he qualifies his
optimism also by stating that tensions
will be sufficiently managed to prevent
war only so long as “the leaders of each
state can exercise the necessary leadership to manage their respective national
pressures.” These caveats are of great
concern, because leaders in both nations
may find it increasingly difficult to manage the growing nationalistic demands
of their constituents. Furthermore,
because the years of cooperative efforts
expertly documented in Manicom’s
case studies have taken the edge off
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many of the material issues, the remaining tension points are predominantly
strategic and symbolic in nature. Still,
despite these criticisms, the lessons
contained in Manicom’s insightful
analysis will be of great value to those
seeking to understand Sino-Japanese
tensions and other maritime disputes.
CDR. JOHN BRADFORD

Commanding Officer, USS Stethem (DDG 63), and
LT. JOELLE PORTZER

USS Stethem

Westad, Odd Arne. Restless Empire: China and
the World since 1750. New York: Basic Books,
2012. 515pp. $32

The Norwegian historian Odd Arne
Westad, in this well-written history of
China over the past 250 years, tells the
story from a broad global perspective.
His approach tracks that of his earlier
works on the Cold War, where he placed
a binational rivalry into a larger world
context. Similarly in this work, he sees
the principal driver of China’s modern
experience as relentless internationalization. However, China is more than just
a country. It is, as Lucien Pye once described it, “a civilization-state, pretending to be a nation-state.” Imperial in every respect, it pushed out, and the world
has pushed back, powerfully, since 1750.
However, the adjective “restless” in the
title is an understatement. No country’s
modern history has been more tumultuous or more violent. Westad describes
episodes, including the worst, that
occurred in the time of “peace” that the
Communist regime was supposed to
usher in. The most deadly and destructive of modern China’s encounters with
the world, Westad astutely notes, was
between 1937 and 1945—its war with
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Japan. In a campaign breathtaking in
its brutality, Japan destroyed China’s
nascent republic, enabled the victory
of the Communists in their civil war
with the Nationalists, and destroyed
the old imperial order in Asia. Thus,
the new China was born into a world
of many possibilities. Unhappily, none
of the good ones, either domestically or internationally, was realized
until 1979, when China’s current
“rise” can be said to have begun.
Westad’s fine account of what has come
before brings us to realize that the rise of
China will not necessarily have a calming effect on either the Chinese people
or on others who live nearby. Since 1750,
“internationalization,” though not entirely a one-way street, has been mostly
that; now, the restless empire, once in a
defensive crouch, is moving out smartly
in all directions. Perhaps this should be
expected of a “civilizational state,” except
that today’s China offers to the world
nothing of what it once did—no high
culture, no attainments in intellectual
and philosophical life, and certainly no
models for wise and effective governance. Instead, as Westad helps us see,
the current regime is thrashing around,
which makes its own future, as well as
the futures both of its “near abroad” and
of the world at large, hard to predict.
Empires, we have been taught, are supposed to bring peace, but today’s Middle
Empire ruled from today’s Beijing
displays many indications that it is bent
on becoming a major disturber of the
peace. Yet even under a more enlightened outlook, there would be challenges: the Middle Empire borders on
three nuclear-weapons states—Russia,
India, and Pakistan—and probably also
a fourth, North Korea. Even so, from
his own well-informed examination of
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China’s modern experience Westad concludes that prospects for peace remain—
not a ringing vote of confidence in the
powers that be in Beijing, but neither is
it a wholly despairing outlook. After all,
Westad is an accomplished historian of
the Cold War, the nonviolent, freedomenhancing outcome of which reminds us
that things do not always turn out badly.
CHARLES HORNER

Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute
Washington, D.C.

Twomey, Christopher P. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in SinoAmerican Relations. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2010. 240pp. $35

It has been said that “weapons speak
to the wise—but in general they need
interpreters.” The Military Lens, written by political scientist Christopher P.
Twomey, associate professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote.
Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines
explain otherwise puzzling examples
of deterrence failure and escalation.
The Military Lens is a welcome addition
to the literature on deterrence, which
too often treats actors as interchangeable “black boxes.” Twomey writes in the
spirit of authors who, like Robert Jervis,
explore psychological factors that led to
misinterpreting the actions of others.
Twomey’s work adds the new factor of
military doctrine. Every military has
its own doctrine, or “theory of victory,”
its vision of how military resources
are to be used to achieve operational
success. Twomey’s core argument is
that strategists look through a doctrinal “lens” when assessing capabilities
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